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The ILA Study Group on Content and Evolution of the Rules of Interpretation was established in May 2015, upon 
approval by the Executive Council of the ILA. The Study Group has held annual meetings since its formation, in 
Athens (13-14 May 2016), The Hague (21-22 April 2017), and Oslo (14-15 May 2018). These meetings have 
been made possible by the generous support of the Athens Public International Law Center (AthensPIL) and 
PluriCourts - Centre for the Study of the Legitimate Roles of the Judiciary in the Global Order.  
                                                 
 This Interim Report was prepared by the Chairs (Pazartizs and Ulfstein) and the Rapporteurs (Peat and Merkouris) on the 
basis of the Preliminary Reports on specific (quasi-) judicial bodies prepared by the members of the Study Group. The Chairs 
and Rapporteurs would like to thank all the members for their tireless work, invaluable contributions and comments to earlier 
drafts of this report.  
 Photini Pazartzis is Professor at the University of Athens, Director of the Athens Public International Law Centre and 
Member of the Human Rights Committee. Geir Ulfstein is Professor at the University of Oslo and Deputy Director of the 
PluriCourts Centre for the Study of the Legitimate Roles of the Judiciary in the Global Order. His contribution to this report 
was supported by the Research Council of Norway through its Centres of Excellence Funding Scheme, project number 223274 
PluriCourts – The Legitimacy of the International Judiciary. Daniel Peat is Assistant Professor in Public International Law, 
Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies, Leiden University. Panos Merkouris is Professor at the University of 
Groningen. His contribution to this report is conducted in the context of the project ‘The Rules of Interpretation of Customary 
International Law’ (‘TRICI-Law’). This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the 
European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme (Grant Agreement No. 759728). 
 
During the Study Group’s inaugural meeting in 2016, the ILA Study Group Road Map was presented and 
discussed. The members present showed particular interest in certain topics, but it was decided that finalisation 
of the work agenda of the Study Group should occur after the input of all members of the Study Group and other 
ILA members at Johannesburg, at which the Group presented its preliminary report. It was decided that the work 
of the Study Group would be divided according to issue areas, with a view to cover the most important courts, 
tribunals and treaty bodies (ICs) and members being invited to draft a report on the approach to interpretation 
adopted by the IC in relation to which they had particular expertise. At the second meeting of the Study Group, 
held in The Hague in 2017, members presented draft reports on the interpretative practice of various ICs, which 
were structured around the questionnaire that is annexed to this Report. Two members (d’Aspremont & Gardiner) 
also presented an introductory paper on the nature of interpretation, which is discussed below. The third meeting 
of the Study Group, which was held in Oslo in 2018, allowed the members of the Group to elaborate their draft 
reports with a view to submitting interim reports in light of the ILA Biennial Meeting in Sydney. The Study Group 
aims to finalise its work by the expiration of its mandate in 2020.  
 
The present Report, which was drafted before the Study Group met in May 2018, will outline the main features 
of the reports on the interpretative approaches of ICs submitted by members. The  divergences  in the interpretative  
practice  across specialist areas can  be  looked  at  from  a  great  variety  of  perspectives.1 Due to space constraints, 
this Report necessarily summarises members’ reports in a very selective manner. Readers that are interested in 
consulting the individual reports in more depth are directed towards the page of the Study Group on the ILA 
website, where full versions of the reports will be uploaded. The Rapporteurs have decided to focus on several 
key issues in this Report: namely, the court or tribunal’s recognition (or otherwise) of Articles 31 to 33 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) as applicable; the application of any maxims or canons of 
interpretation outside the framework of the VCLT; and any factors that influence or may explain the interpretative 
approach of the particular court or tribunal.  
 
The term ‘interpretation’ is often used to denote processes that have different objects and are governed by different 
rules.2 ‘What is interpreted in international legal practice and discourses mainly include the legal pedigree of rules 
(law-ascertainment formalism), the content of rules (content-determination interpretation),3 and facts (facts-
determination or evidentiary interpretation)’.4 For the purposes of this Report, and unless otherwise explicitly 




The jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at first sight epitomizes the orthodox approach to 
treaty interpretation, manifesting, in the words of one author, “une symbiose parfaite”6 with the rules of 
interpretation that are codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).  
 
The link between the practice of the World Court and the development of the rules of interpretation is clear in the 
work of the International Law Commission, which almost exclusively relied on the jurisprudence of the nascent 
ICJ and its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), as the basis upon which to elaborate 
the rules that later became Articles 31-33 of the VCLT.7  
 
Yet, despite this close link between the World Court and the rules of the VCLT, understanding the interpretative 
practice of the Court is not as straightforward as it seems. The Court adopts a pragmatic approach to interpretation, 
which rejects a mechanistic approach to the rules of interpretation and admits the existence of interpretative 
                                                 
1 See Report submitted by Gardiner and d’Aspremont. 
2 A Marmor, ‘Textualism in Context’, USC Gould School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 12-13 - July 18, 
2012.  
3 GJ Postema, Legal Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: The Common Law World (Springer 2001), 390-3: R Dworkin, 
Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press 1986); J d'Aspremont, ‘The Multidimensional Process of Interpretation: Content-
Determination and Law-Ascertainment Distinguished’, in A Bianchi, D Peat and M Windsor (eds), Interpretation in 
International Law (OUP 2015). 
4 Facts can also the object of several types of interpretive processes. In that sense, establishing facts can also be understood as 
an interpretive process (See e.g. J d’Aspremont and MM Mbengue, ‘Strategies of Engagement with Scientific Fact-finding in 
International Adjudication’, (2014) 5/2 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 240–72. Yet, it remains that the two main 
facets of interpretation pertains to the determination of the content of rules and the ascertainment of these rules as legal rules) 
5 Based on a report submitted by Panos Merkouris and Daniel Peat.  
6 M Forteau, ‘Les techniques interpretatives de la Cour internationale de justice’, (2011) 115/2 RGDIP 399; H Thirlway, The 
Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Fifty Years of Jurisprudence (OUP 2013) 269.  
7 See for example, Yearbook of the ILC 1966, vol II, 217-26.  
principles that are not codified in the VCLT, albeit usually in a supplementary fashion. This approach has provided 
the Court with a great degree of latitude, both in terms of the materials that it takes into account in the interpretative 
process and the weight that it gives to different elements of interpretation.  
 
The Court attributes great weight to the text and its ‘ordinary meaning’, and although it recognizes it as a starting 
point, it does not consider it hierarchically superior to other approaches. ‘The rule of interpretation according to 
the natural and ordinary meaning of the words employed “is not an absolute one. Where such a method of 
interpretation results in a meaning incompatible with the spirit, purpose and context of the clause or instrument in 
which the words are contained, no reliance can be validly placed on it.” (South West Africa, Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 336)’.8 
 
The Court’s preference towards a ‘holistic approach’ to interpretation aside, it has generally been reticent to 
explicitly define particular concepts in the general rule of interpretation and the supplementary means of 
interpretation available under Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. Nevertheless, some judgments 
provide an insight into the Court’s conception of these elements.9  
 
Although the Court post-VCLT has eventually settled to a tendency of referring to the VCLT rules, even if simply 
to assert that they codify customary international law, on occasion it has referred to maxims/canons of 
interpretation not explicitly mentioned in the VCLT. These include in dubio mitius,10 effet utile (ut res magis 
valeat quam pereat),11 contra proferentem,12 expressio unius est exclusio alterius/ a contrario,13 ejusdem 
generis,14 per analogiam,15 and a minore ad majus.16 This practice was for obvious reasons more prevalent during 
the pre-VCLT era,17 and nowadays when referred to the Court tends to stress their supplementary nature, or their 
subsumption by the VCLT rules.18 
 
Although the use of publications to assist in the interpretative process was and remains a common practice in the 
Separate and Dissenting Opinions of Judges of the PCIJ and ICJ in order to bolster their findings, the Court (and 
the PCIJ) tend to be much more cautious. However, there have been cases where both the PCIJ and the ICJ have 
found recourse to material, such as dictionaries19 and  ILC Draft Codes and Articles.20  
 
Finally, the Courts when required have also dabbled in interpretation of non-treaty instruments, such as optional 
clause declarations and Security Council resolutions. Although the interpretation of these instruments bears 
striking similarities with that of treaties, the Court and academics have cautioned that ‘the provisions of [the 
                                                 
8 Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v Senegal) (Judgment) [1991] ICJ Rep 53, [48]. 
9 In more detail, and analysis of relevant case-law see Report submitted by Merkouris and Peat. 
10 Interpretation of Article 3‚ Paragraph 2‚ of the Treaty of Lausanne (Advisory Opinion), PCIJ Series B, No 12, 25; Case 
relating to the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder, PCIJ Series A, No 23, 26.  
11 See case-law mentioned in G Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty 
Interpretation and Other Points’, (1957) 33 BYIL 203; H Thirlway, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of 
Justice 1960-1989: Supplement 2006, Part Three’, (2006) 77 BYIL 1, 52-5. 
12 Case concerning the Payment in Gold of Brazilian Federal Loans Contracted in France (France v Brazil), PCIJ Series A, 
No 21; Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spain v  Canada), [1998] ICJ Rep 432, [51]. 
13 The S.S. “Wimbledon”, PCIJ Series A, No 1, 24; Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland (Advisory Opinion), PCIJ 
Series A/B, No 42, 121; Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v Albania), [1949] ICJ Rep 15, Dissenting Opinion by Judge 
Azevedo, [30]; United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran), [1980] ICJ Rep 3, 
[40];  Application for Review of Judgment No. 273 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal (Advisory Opinion), [1982] 
ICJ Rep 325, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel, 488; Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), [1986] ICJ Rep 
554, [88]. 
14 Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v United Kingdom) (Preliminary Objections), [1963] ICJ Rep 15, Separate Opinion of 
Judge Sir Percy Spender, 91. 
15 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion), [1949] ICJ Rep  174, 182; Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), 
[1984] ICJ Rep 392, [63]; Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spain v  Canada), [1998] ICJ Rep 432, [46]. 
16 Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v Albania) (Merits), [1949] ICJ Rep 4, Dissenting Opinion by Judge Azevedo, [22]. 
17 See, for instance, Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), [2009] ICJ Rep 213, [48], 
where the ICJ refused to apply the in dubio mitius principle. 
18 With the effet utile being perhaps a notable exception. 
19 Competence of the International Labour Organization in regard to International Regulation of the Conditions of Labour of 
Persons Employed in Agriculture (Advisory Opinion), PCIJ Series B, No 2, [41-5]; Oil Platforms (Iran v United States of 
America) (Preliminary Objections), [1996] ICJ Rep 803, [45]. 
20 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy), [2012] ICJ Rep 99, [64]; Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment), [2007] 
ICJ Rep 43, [186]. 




ii. Ad hoc arbitrations22  
The nature of ad hoc tribunals means that awards are less likely to exhibit trends in interpretation that might be 
evident in the jurisprudence of a permanent court or tribunal. Indeed, the practice is too variegated to draw one 
predominant approach. Whilst the awards manifest an eclectic approach to interpretation, some offer more 
thorough accounts of interpretation or specific indications of how relevant principles of interpretation are to be 
applied, especially the Rhine Chlorides and Iron Rhine awards.23 
 
In the early period (i.e. pre-VCLT) certain tribunals adopted a Vattelian approach according to which it is not 
allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation. Thus the Tribunal in John Hois, held that: ‘[i]t is not 
permissible for the Commissioner to speculate with respect to what the treaty makers might or could have provided 
when their language is clear’.24 Historically, the case law of ad hoc arbitral tribunals seems to show that tribunals 
referred frequently to a subjective intention in the context of bilateral treaties.25 For example, the Tribunal in the 
Island of East Timor case stated that the interpretation of treaties ought ‘to be made in conformity with the real 
mutual intentions of the parties, and also in conformity with what can be presumed between parties acting loyally 
and with reason, not that which has been promised by one to the other according to the meaning of the words 
used’.26 This search for the intention of the Parties has even extended to interpretation of treaties contra legem.27 
In the post-VCLT period, however, there appeared to be, eventually, a shift in the interpretative approaches of 
tribunals. Although acknowledging that the purpose of interpretation is to search for the intentions of the parties, 
tribunals recognised that this was to be done through the means of interpretation set out in the Vienna Rules.28 
 
Few post-VCLT ad hoc tribunals have placed reliance on maxims of interpretation that are not explicitly enshrined 
in the VCLT. Certain instances nevertheless bear mention. The principle of effectiveness was invoked by the 
tribunals in Rhine Chlorides and Iron Rhine;29the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius was referred to by 
the Tribunal in the Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946 (United States v France) arbitration;30 and the 
maxim generalia specialibus non derogant was considered by the tribunal to be available and of potential use in 




                                                 
21 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spain v  Canada), [1998] ICJ Rep 432, [46] (emphasis added); see also Land and Maritime 
Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria) (Preliminary Objections), [1998] ICJ Rep 275,[30]; Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), 
[1984] ICJ Rep 392, [63];; E Papastavridis, ‘Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions Under Chapter VII in the Aftermath 
of the Iraqi Crisis’, (2007) 56/1 ICLQ 83; M Wood, ‘The interpretation of Security Council Resolutions’, (1998) 2 Max Planck 
Yearbook of United Nations Law 73; M Bos, ‘The Interpretation of Decisions of International Organisations’, (1981) 28 NILR 
1. 
22 Based on a report submitted by Richard Gardiner and Eirik Bjorge.  
23 Case Concerning the Auditing of Accounts (Netherlands v France) (2004) 144 ILR 259; Arbitration regarding the Iron 
Rhine (“IJzeren Rijn”) Railway (Belgium/Netherlands) (2005) 27 RIAA 35. 
24 Louis John Hois (United States) v Austria and Wiener Bank-Verein (1928) 6 RIAA 265. 
25 See for example Island of East Timor case (1914) 11 RIAA 497 and Ambatielos (1956) 12 RIAA 107. 
26 Island of East Timor, 497. 
27 Italy–United States Air Transport, Arbitration (1965) 45 ILR 393, 409–10. 
28 Dispute concerning Filleting within the Gulf of St. Lawrence (‘La Bretagne’) (Canada/France) (1986) 82 ILR 591, 659, 
[67]; Young Loan Arbitration (1980) 59 ILR 494, 530, [19]; Decision regarding Delimitation of the Border between Eritrea 
and Ethiopia (2002) 25 RIAA 83, 110; (2002) 130 ILR 1, 34, [3.4]; Case Concerning the Auditing of Accounts between the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands and the French Republic Pursuant to the Additional Protocol of 25 September 1991 to the 
Convention on the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution by Chlorides of 3 December 1976 (Netherlands/France) (2004) 
25 RIAA 267; (2004) 144 ILR 259, 293, [62]; Award in the Arbitration regarding the Iron Rhine (‘Ijzeren Rijn’) (Belgium v 
Netherlands) (2005) 27 RIAA 35, 65, [53]. 
29 Rhine Chlorides, [92]; Iron Rhine, [49]. 
30 Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946 (United States v France), (1978) 54 ILR 303, 316. 
31 Argentina/Chile (Beagle Channel) 21 RIAA 53, [39]. 
32 Based on a report submitted by Valerie Boré Eveno.  
In the jurisprudence of ITLOS, express reference to the rules enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT is rare. 
The Tribunal has mentioned those provisions in only two cases,33 and in only one instance in its full composition.34 
Nevertheless, the Tribunal has implicitly referred to and regularly borrowed the terminology and methodology 
enshrined within Articles 31 to 33 VCLT, even if not citing those articles explicitly.35  
 
The Tribunal has adopted a flexible, pragmatic approach to interpretation, without necessarily following a strict 
sequence of interpretative techniques.36 Despite this flexibility, the general approach of the Tribunal has been to 
read the provision being interpreted in light of other provisions of the Convention that concern the same subject 
or using the same terminology,  or even in a broader context in light of the object and purpose of these provisions 
or the Convention. This conforms to the general approach of the rule of interpretation enshrined in Article 31 (1) 
VCLT. On the other hand, there are few references to the travaux préparatoires in the jurisprudence of the 
Tribunal.  
 
Rarely has the Tribunal drawn expressly on maxims or canons of interpretation that lie outside the scope of the 
VCLT, with the exception of reference to prior jurisprudence (if, indeed, one considers that to be a “canon” of 
interpretation). On occasion, however, the Tribunal seems to have implicitly relied on other maxims of 
interpretation, such as effet utile,37 restrictive or expansive interpretation,38 in dubio mitius,39 and expressio unius 
est exclusion alterius.40 
 
With the exception of its own jurisprudence and that of the ICJ or arbitral tribunals, the Tribunal rarely explicates 
the materials upon which it draws in order to make an interpretation.41 It has occasionally relied on certain 
materials that fit within the rubric of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention, such as other international 
agreements,42 the work of the International Law Commission (particularly in relation to State responsibility), and 
the preparatory work of the UNCLOS (i.e. the records of the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea and work 
of the ILC). 
 
One might surmise that certain factors have led to the Tribunal’s particular approach to interpretation. The first 
element is that the majority of cases with which the Tribunal was seised (15 out of 25) related to emergency 
procedures, such as prompt release of ships or provisional measures, which explains the relatively summary nature 
of decisions issued by ITLOS. Second, UNCLOS does not refer to any applicable rule of interpretation, which, in 
combination with vague provisions in the Convention, leaves a significant discretion to the Tribunal and could 
explain its pragmatist and constructive approach to interpretation. Third, one might think that the customary 
origins of certain rules incorporated into UNCLOS lead to a certain reticence on the part of the Tribunal to apply 
rules of treaty interpretation to those provisions. This impression is supported by the fact that the two times in 
which the Tribunal has referred to the articles of the VCLT, the provisions at issue did not have customary origins. 
Fourth, from a systemic point of view, the interpretative approach of ITLOS might be dictated by the desire to 
assert itself as a specialized court, different from other courts and tribunals that are competent to hear cases related 
to the law of the sea, such as the ICJ. Fifth, the composition of the 21-member bench, and – in particular – the 
previous experience that those judges, as well as judges ad hoc, bring to the bench may form the approach adopted 
by the Tribunal. Finally, the fact that international organisations, and even private persons (in relation to activities 
                                                 
33 Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal 
(Bangladesh/Myanmar), ITLOS Case No 16 (Judgment, 14 March 2012); Responsibilities and obligations of States sponsoring 
persons and entities with respect to activities in the Area, ITLOS Case No 17 (Advisory Opinion, 1 February 2011).  
34 Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal 
(Bangladesh/Myanmar), ITLOS Case No 16 (Judgment, 14 March 2012). 
35 See e.g. The ‘Volga’ Case (Russian Federation v Australia), ITLOS Case No 11 (Judgment, 23 December 2002), [77]; The 
MOX Plant Case (Ireland v United Kingdom), ITLOS Case No 10 (Order, 3 December 2001), [51]. 
36 See The M/V ‘Virginia G’ Case (Panama/Guinea-Bissau), ITLOS Case No 19 (Judgment, 14 April 2014) [98]; The M/V 
‘Louisa’ Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v Kingdom of Spain), ITLOS Case No 18 (Judgment, 28 May 2013), [137]; 
Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean 
(Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire), ITLOS Case No 23 (Judgment, 23 September 2017), [624 et seq].  
37 Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal 
(Bangladesh/Myanmar), ITLOS Case No 16 (Judgment, 14 March 2012), [391].  
38 Request for an Advisory Opinion submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC), ITLOS Case No 21 
(Advisory Opinion, 2 April 2015), [68].  
39 Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean 
(Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire), ITLOS Case No 23 (Judgment, 23 September 2017), [545 et seq].  
40 Ibid, [549-50].  
41 See Request for an Advisory Opinion submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC), ITLOS Case No 21 
(Advisory Opinion, 2 April 2015), Separate Opinion of Judge Cot, [32].  
42 The M/V ‘Virginia G’ Case (Panama/Guinea-Bissau), ITLOS Case No 19 (Judgment, 14 April 2014) [216]. 
carried out in the Zone), may appear before the Tribunal is without doubt a factor favouring the teleo-systemic 




The interpretative approach of the panels and Appellate Body (AB) of the WTO has been guided by Article 3.2 
of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), which provides that the purpose of the dispute settlement system 
is ‘to clarify the existing provisions [of the covered agreements] in accordance with customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law.’ The AB referred to the VCLT rules of interpretation in its first decision 
(U.S.—Gasoline 1996), and has affirmed that Articles 31, 32, and 33 of the VCLT reflect the customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law,44 and thus are applicable by virtue of Article 3.2 DSU. It has, however, 
frequently applied other rules or principles of interpretation. 
 
At the time that the WTO was formed, the member states determined to modify the interpretative style followed 
previously in GATT dispute settlement.  The GATT period was characterized by frequent and early resort to 
travaux préparatoires.  Article 3.2 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding was formulated to refer 
explicitly to the rules of interpretation of customary international law, and implicitly to the VCLT, which was 
thought to prioritize text and context over travaux préparatoires. The case law of the AB is equivocal about the 
relationship between Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, emphasizing in some cases a sequential relationship between the 
two provisions,45 whilst also recognizing in other cases that ‘[t]he principles of interpretation that are set out in 
Articles 31 and 32 are to be followed in a holistic fashion.’46  
 
The AB has adopted certain canons of interpretation that lay outside the framework of Articles 31 and 32 of the 
VCLT, in particular effet utile, which has been influential in countless cases.47 Another interpretative principle 
used is that of cumulative application, whereby each restrictive provision generally applies, regardless of whether 
another provision applies, and regardless of whether another provision seems to permit the relevant conduct.48 
Other canons of interpretation that lay outside the VCLT have also been applied by the AB, including ejusdem 
generis,49 a contrario interpretation,50 and in dubio mitius.51  
 
Whilst, in early WTO jurisprudence, the AB emphasized dictionary definitions as indicative of ordinary meaning, 
the AB has criticized the extent to which panels rely on dictionary definitions: ‘to the extent that the Panel’s 
reasoning simply equates the ‘ordinary meaning’ with the meaning of words as defined in dictionaries, this is, in 
our view, too mechanical an approach.’52 In EC—Chicken Classification, the AB clarified its approach to 
‘ordinary meaning.’ First, dictionaries are a useful starting point, but ‘must be seen in the light of the intention of 
                                                 
43 Based on a report submitted by Hélène Ruiz Fabri & Joel Trachtman.  
44 United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Appellate Body Report, adopted 
20 May 1996), 16-7; Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/ AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Appellate 
Body Report, adopted 1 November 1996), 104, note 17; United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect 
to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS257/AB/R (Appellate Body Report, adopted 17 February 2004), [59]. 
45 European Communities – Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, 
WT/DS68/AB/R (Appellate Body Report, adopted 22 June 1998), [85].  
46 United States – Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology, WT/DS350/AB/R (Appellate Body Report, 
adopted 19 February 2009), [268].   
47  United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Appellate Body Report, adopted 
20 May 1996), 23.   
48 Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R (Appellate Body Report, adopted 12 January 
2000), [81].   
49 United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, WT/DS384/AB/R / WT/DS386/AB/R 
(Appellate Body Report, adopted 23 July 2012), [444]. 
50 Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Appellate Body Report, 
adopted 1 November 1996), 18. Although cf. United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R (Appellate Body Report, adopted 25 March 2011), [567]. See also [581]. 
51 EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Appellate Body Report, adopted 
13 February 1998), note 154. Although cf. China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain 
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/AB/R (Appellate Body Report, adopted 19 January 2010), 
[411]. 
52  United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R 
(Appellate Body Report, adopted 20 April 2005), [166 and 175-6].  ‘We do not accept, as the Panel appears to have done, that, 
simply by requesting the preparation and circulation of these documents and using them in preparing their offers, the parties 
in the negotiations have accepted them as agreements or instruments related to the treaty.  Indeed, there are indications to the 
contrary’ [176]. For a history and analysis of the Appellate Body’s use of dictionaries, see I Van Damme, Treaty Interpretation 
by the WTO Appellate Body (Oxford 2009), 221-35. 
the parties “as expressed in the words used by them against the light of surrounding circumstances”.’53  Second, 
‘interpretation pursuant to the customary rules codified in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention is ultimately a 
holistic exercise that should not be mechanically subdivided into rigid components.’54  The Appellate Body has 
cautioned against equating ‘ordinary meaning’ with dictionary definition.55 
 
In relation to context, the AB has often interpreted specific provisions of WTO law by reference to other 
provisions of WTO law, utilizing the other provisions as context, and seeking to provide an integrated and 
coherent approach to the overall treaty.56 The AB has also adopted a broader conception of context in certain 
cases. In its Computers decision, for example, the AB found that the Harmonized System and its Explanatory 
Notes, including decisions by the Harmonized System Committee of the World Customs Organization, were part 
of the context required to be considered.57  
 
In relation to object and purpose, the AB has stated that the object and purpose to be referenced is that of the treaty 
as a whole, rather than that of a specific provision, although it is also possible to take into account the object and 
purpose of specific treaty terms or specific agreements. Thus, ‘to the extent that we can speak of the “object and 
purpose of a treaty provision”, it will be informed by, and will be in consonance with, the object and purpose of 
the entire treaty of which it is but a component.’58 
 
The AB has been forthcoming in explicating the stages in its interpretative reasoning, most clearly when operating 
under the VCLT. According to some views59, sticking to a rather dominantly textualist approach60 was a way for 
the Appellate Body to be rid of the teleological approach (‘embedded liberalism’) in force during the GATT.  
 
  
v. The UN Human Rights Committee, other UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies and Treaty Interpretation61 
The Human Rights Committee (HRCttee) and the other UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies (hereinafter collectively 
referred to as UN-HRTBs) are treaty-monitoring bodies, which perform three main functions: i) they conduct 
periodic state reporting procedures; ii) they develop/adopt General Comments and iii) they hear 
‘communications’, i.e. complaints by individuals under the human rights treaties. It is this multifariousness of the 
roles that the UN-HRTBs are called to play, the synthesis of the various Committees, the ‘pragmatic’ structure of 
the Views, and their ‘audience’ that are some of the factors that influence the interpretative approaches and 
solutions adopted by the UN-HRTBs.  
 
The UN-HRTBs jurisprudence (views) contain only sporadic and limited explicit references to the VCLT rules.62 
Such references were encountered more often in the early stages of evolution of the UN-HRTBs’ body of work, 
                                                 
53  European Communities – Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, WT/DS269/AB/R, WT/DS286/AB/R 
(Appellate Body Report, adopted 27 September 2005), [175], citing Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties (Clarendon Press 
1961), 365.   
54  European Communities – Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, WT/DS269/AB/R, WT/DS286/AB/R 
(Appellate Body Report, adopted 27 September 2005), [176].   
55  China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual 
Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/AB/R (Appellate Body Report, adopted 19 January 2010), [348]. 
56  Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, WT/DS98/AB/R (Appellate Body Report, 
adopted 12 January 2000), [81] (citations omitted). 
57  European Communities – Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, 
WT/DS68/AB/R (Appellate Body Report, adopted 22 June 1998), [92]. See also European Communities – Customs 
Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, WT/DS269/AB/R, WT/DS286/AB/R (Appellate Body Report, adopted 
27 September 2005), [199]. 
58  European Communities – Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, WT/DS269/AB/R, WT/DS286/AB/R 
(Appellate Body Report, adopted 27 September 2005), [238] (citation omitted).   
59 R Howse, ‘The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global Governance by Judiciary’, (2016) 27/1 EJIL 9-77. 
60 G Distefano and P Mavroidis, ‘L’interprétation systémique : le liant de l’ordre international’, in O Guillod and Ch Müller 
(eds), Pour un droit équitable, engagé et chaleureux, Mélanges en l’honneur de Pierre Wessner (Helbing Lichtenhahn 2011), 
743-59.  
61 Based on a report submitted by Photini Pazartzis and Panos Merkouris. 
62 SWM Brocks v The Netherlands, Communication No 172/1984 (Views adopted on 9 April 1987), [12.2-3]; LG Danning v 
The Netherlands, Communication No 180/1984 and FH Zwaan-de Vries v The Netherlands, Communication No 182/1984 
(Views adopted on 9 April 1987), [12.2-3]; Errol Johnson v Jamaica, Communication No 588/1994 (Views adopted on 22 
March 1996), [8.2]; Robinson LaVende v Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No 554/1993 (Views adopted on 29 October 
1997), [5.3]; Ramcharan Bickaroo v Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No 555/1993 (Views adopted on 29 October 
1997), [5.3]. 
but gradually have been making increasingly rarer appearances,63 possibly in an attempt to make the views more 
accessible and palatable to a wider audience. Nonetheless, that is not to say that the UN-HRTBs do not adhere to 
the VCLT rules, far from it. Despite the fact that the UN-HRTBs often announce the interpretative result without 
much in the direction of an exegesis, there are frequent references to the wording and denominations of 
interpretative norms and methods as stipulated under the VCLT,64 and the structure of Arts. 31-33 VCLT is often 
used as inspiration.65   
 
The UN-HRTBs, of course, seek the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the terms to be interpreted66 in ‘good faith’,67 and refer 
to ‘context’ ‘subsequent practice’ and other ‘relevant rules’,68 as well as ‘other supplementary means’.69 However, 
consistent with their special roles as bodies supervising the application of international human rights treaties, the 
UN-HRTBs (and particularly the HRCttee) have progressively favored a broader and more liberal interpretation 
of the Covenant’s provisions,70 although it is difficult to ‘identify a consistent trend of liberalism or conservatism, 
and this has been attributed mainly to the changes in composition of the HRC over time’.71  
 
They have done so mainly by referring to the ‘living instrument’ doctrine and holding that ‘the rights protected 
under [the core UN human rights treaties] should be applied in context and in the light of present–day 
conditions’.72 Other interpretative principles, maxims or techniques, not explicitly mentioned in the VCLT, that 
have been used by the UN-HRTBs include the ut res magis valeat quam pereat principle,73 and a contrario 
interpretation.74 and ‘margin of appreciation’75 although this last one is rather better characterized as ‘application’ 
than ‘interpretation’.  
 
The UN-HRTBs have also predominantly favored a self-referential approach of invoking their own Concluding 
Observations, General Comments and jurisprudence.76 On occasion, they have even referred to General 
                                                 
63 Appearing mostly either in individual opinions of members or more likely in the arguments of the parties; TM v Sweden, 
Communication No 228/2003 (Views adopted on 18 November 2003), CAT/C/31/D/228/2003, Individual opinion by 
Committee member, Mr Fernando Mariño Menéndez. 
64 E.g references to ‘object and purpose’, ‘travaux préparatoires’ etc. See inter alia: Robinson LaVende v Trinidad and Tobago, 
Communication No 554/1993 (Views adopted on 29 October 1997), [5.3-4]; Lauri Peltonen v Finland, Communication No 
492/1992 (Views adopted on 21 July 1994), [8.3]; Hugo van Alphen v The Netherlands, Communication No 305/1988 (Views 
adopted on 23 July 1990), [5.8]. 
65 Antti Vuolanne v Finland, Communication No 265/1987 (Views adopted on 7 April 1989), [9.3]; Roger Judge v Canada, 
Communication No 829/1998 (Views adopted on 5 August 2002), [10.4-5]. 
66 Charles Stewart v Canada, Communication No 538/1993 (Views adopted on 1 November 1996), [12.4]; Darmon Sultanova 
v Uzbekistan, Communication No 915/2000 (Views adopted on 30 March 2006), [7.3]. Sometimes the ‘ordinary meaning’ is 
determined by reference to other international instruments, although this blurs somewhat the lines between Art. 31(1) and 
31(3)(c) of the VCLT; Grioua v Algeria, Communication No 1327/2004 (Views adopted on 10 July 2007), [7.2].    
67 Glen Ashby v Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No 580/1994 (Views adopted on 21 March 2002) [10.8-9]. 
68 Keith Cox v Canada, Communication No 539/1993 (Views adopted on 31 October 1994), [16.2]; Marie-Hélène Gillot et al 
v France, Communication No 932/2000 (Views adopted on 15 July 2002), [13.4]; DR v Australia, Communication No 42/2008 
(Opinion adopted on 14 August 2009), CERD/C/75/D/42/2008, [6.3]; Yeo-Bum Yoon and Myung-Jin Choi v Republic of 
Korea, Communications Nos 1321/2004 and 1322/2004 (Views adopted on 23 January 2007), [8-9]; S Jegatheeswara Sarma 
v Sri Lanka, Communication No 950/2000 (Views adopted on 16 July 2003), [9.2-3]; Franz Wallmann et al v Austria, 
Communication No 1002/2001 (Views adopted on 1 April 2004), [8.4]; Klaus Dieter Baumgarten v Germany, Communication 
No 960/2000 (Views adopted on 31 July 2003), [9.4]. 
69 SWM Brocks v The Netherlands, Communication No 172/1984 (Views adopted on 9 April 1987), [12.2]. 
70 Using teleological interpretation, either be referring simply to the ‘object and purpose’ of the treaty, or by referring to the 
nature of the treaty as a ‘living instrument’. 
71 Report submitted by Fay Pazartis and Panso Merkouris, 7. 
72 Roger Judge v Canada, Communication No 829/1998 (Views adopted on 5 August 2002), [10.3-7]; Joseph Kindler v 
Canada, Communication No 470/1991 (Views adopted on 30 July 1993), [14.2]. 
For the other Committees see: Stephen Hagan v Australia, Communication No 26/2002 (Opinion adopted on 20 March 2003), 
CERD/C/62/D/26/2002, [7.3]; Elizabeth de Blok et al v the Netherlands, Communication No 36/2012 (Views adopted on 17 
February 2014), CEDAW/C/57/D/36/2012, [5.5].  
73 Kennedy v Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No 845/1999 (Views adopted 2 November 1999), [6.6-7]; Oleg 
Grishkovtsov v Belarus, Communication No 2013/2010 (Views adopted on 1 April 2015), [6.4-5]; Peter Chiiko Bwalya v 
Zambia, Communication No 314/1988 (Views adopted on 14 July 1993), [6.4]; The Jewish Community of Oslo et al v Norway, 
Communication No 30/2003 (Opinion adopted on 15 August 2005), CERD/C/67/D/30/2003, [7.4]; RS et al v Switzerland, 
Communication No 482/2011 (Views adopted on 21 November 2014), CAT/C/53/D/482/2011, [7]. 
74 Charles Stewart v Canada, Communication No 538/1993 (Views adopted on 1 November 1996), [12.7]. 
75 Ilmari Länsman et al v Finland, Communication No 511/1992 (Views adopted on 26 October 1994), [9.4]; Leo R Hertzberg 
et al v Finland, Communication No 61/1979 (Views adopted on 2 April 1982), [10.3]. 
76 TPF v Peru, Communication No 22/2009 (Views adopted on 17 October 2011), CEDAW/C/50/D/22/2009, [8.11]; DR v 
Australia, Communication No 42/2008 (Opinion adopted on 14 August 2009), CERD/C/75/D/42/2008, [6.4]; Sahli v Algeria, 
Comments of other human rights treaties.77   Despite the importance of General Comments in their jurisprudence, 
the Views of the UN-HRTBs do not shed any substantial light as to where exactly in the Article 31-32 VCLT 
framework they consider such reference to fall. The most that has been said has been that such 
Comments/Recommendations are ‘an authoritative interpretation tool’.78 
 
Finally, on occasion, the HRCttee has also followed a more subjective line of interpretation motivated by its 
concern to convey the ‘proper’ message to States parties,79 although this has also been criticized as being 
extremely subjective and tantamount to hypothetical reasoning.80  
 
 
vi. Inter-American Commission/Court of Human Rights81  
Generally, the IACtHR refers, in passing, to the VCLT asserting that such question must be analyzed in conformity 
with the customary rules of interpretation enshrined in the VCLT. This mention appears in a very formal way, as 
a sort of necessary and obliged international classical mantra. When a very specific rule of the VCLT is cited, it 
is only to point it out within the framework of its general demonstration. It has to be pointed out that an ‘explicit 
mention to the way of interpreting (a kind of pedagogical development addressed in a special section or paragraph 
… is quite common trend in the advisory function of the IACtHR, although not in the contentious cases, unless 
the Court is dealing with a ‘hard case’.82 However, the IACtHR does not make any substantial considerations 
about interpretation in general and about VCLT’s rules of interpretation in particular.83 Even where Advisory 
opinions are concerned, where in some instances a “discussion” of the VCLT rules was required, this did not 
trigger a real reflection on its “interpretation rules”.84 Because of this, it is quite challenging to find a clear shift 
in the apprehension of the content of a rule of interpretation, since the Court does not clearly detail the meaning 
of VLCT rules, nor does it explain any shifts in its approach to them. 
 
During the first years of its functioning, the IACtHR used to point out quite regularly the rules of the VCLT. After 
a while, during A. Cançado Trindade tenure, Article 29(b) of the ACHR was its main focal point, and in fact the 
Court has interpreted its own standard of interpretation enshrined in that article.85 Nowadays, we could affirm that 
both “rules” (VCLT rules and American convention rules of interpretation) are used, mixed with all the other 
kinds of “techniques of interpretation”.  
 
Needless to say that such preference and prevalence of interpretation developed by the IACtHR is a clearly 
teleological one. This approach has been pointed out since the very beginning of its activity,86 and holds strong 
until today.87 Textual, contextual, intention of the parties, and historical interpretation have also been resorted to, 
with different weight being given to them,88 yet the teleological remains the dominant one. Revealing is the latest 
                                                 
Communication No 341/2008 (Views adopted on 3 June 2011), CAT/C/46/D/341/2008, [9.9]; Abramova v Belarus, 
Communication No 23/2009 (Views adopted on 25 July 2011),   CEDAW/C/49/D/23/2009, [7.3]. 
77 Abramova v Belarus, Communication No 23/2009 (Views adopted on 25 July 2011), CEDAW/C/49/D/23/2009, [7.6]; 
Muñoz-Vargas y Sainz de Vicuña v Spain, Communication No 7/2005 (Decision adopted on 9 August 2007), 
CEDAW/C/39/D/7/2005, Individual Opinion by Committee member Mary Shanthi Dairiam (dissenting),  [13.9].  
78 TPF v Peru, Communication No 22/2009 (Views adopted on 17 October 2011), CEDAW/C/50/D/22/2009, [8.11] (emphasis 
added). 
79 Errol Johnson v Jamaica, Communication No 588/1994 (Views adopted on 22 March 1996), [8.4]. 
80 Errol Johnson v Jamaica, Communication No 588/1994 (Views adopted on 22 March 1996), Individual Opinions of 
Christine Chanet and Francisco José Aguilar Urbina. 
81 Based on a report submitted by Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen.  
82 See Report submitted by Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, 22-5. 
83 Viviana Gallardo and al, IACtHR (Order of the President of the Court, 15 July 1981), Series A, No 101, OC-21/14. 
84 The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights (Arts 74 and 75), IACtHR 
(24 September 1982), OC-2/82; Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4§2 and 4§4) American Convention on Human Rights), 
IACtHR (8 September 1983), OC-3/83, [45].  
85 Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts 13 and 29) (requested 
by Costa Rica), IACtHR (13 November 1985), OC-5/85, [44]; see also Report submitted by Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, 32-
4 on ‘the conventionality control’. 
86 Viviana Gallardo and al, IACtHR (Order of the President of the Court, 15 July 1981), Series A, No 101, [15-6]; ‘Other 
Treaties’ Subjected to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court (Art 64 American Convention on Human Rights), IACtHR 
(24 September 1982), OC-1/82. 
87 Mapiripán Massacre v Colombia, IACtHR (Judgment, 15 November2005), Series C No134, [104]; Baena Ricardo v Peru, 
IACtHR (Judgment, 28 November 2003), Series C No 104, [96]. 
88 In more detail see Report submitted by Burgorgue-Larsen, 9-11. Of note is the original dismissal by the Court of the 
‘subjective criteria’ (e.g. the intention of the parties) in Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4§2 and 4§4) American 
Convention on Human Rights), IACtHR (8 September 1983), OC-3/82, [50], which was a few years later tempered by the 
search for the ‘intention of all the American States’. 
advisory opinion where the Court asserted that the textual approach and good faith could not be “a rule in itself”. 
For the Court, “the interpretation exercise must integrate the context, and more especially, the object and 
purpose”.89  
 
What are called other “maxims/canons” of interpretation cannot be said to have been clearly used by Inter-
American bodies. However, other “interpretation techniques”, such as the pro homine (or pro persona) principle, 
the international corpus juris, effet utile, the ‘integration technique’ and the ‘combinaison normative’ techinque,90 
are strongly employed in Inter-American case-law. 
 
The interpretative approach does not change when unilateral acts of States or of international organizations are 
concerned, e.g. waivers;91 reservations,92 or declarations.93 As the IACtHR has pointed out, a textual interpretation 
mixed with the teleological one ensures that the realm of the discretionary power of the States is diminished.94 
 
Finally, a wide array of factors, both internal and external have and continue to shape the Court’s bold approach 
to interpretation. These include: i) legal internal factors (the features of the American Declaration and Convention; 
the ratione materiae jurisdiction of the IACtHR; the Court’s Statute); ii) sociological internal factors (e.g. the 
composition of the Court – background and profile of the legal staff); iii) external factors (e.g. the political context 
during the first steps of the Inter-American Human Rights System).95 
 
 
vii. European Court of Human Rights96 
The interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) raises certain questions that are specific to 
that regime: for example, whether human rights conventions should be interpreted in a special way; the extent to 
which judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) incur on the sovereignty of the contracting 
parties; and the relationship between interpretation and deference.  
 
At the outset, it should be noted that the Court has addressed the VCLT’s application to ECHR in several cases. 
In the Demir and Baykara (2008), the Court stated that it is ‘guided mainly by the rules of interpretation provided 
for in articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’. The Court has in its subsequent practice 
constantly confirmed the relevance of the Vienna Convention for the interpretation of the ECHR. But, as in the 
Demir and Baykara, the significance of the VCLT has been subject to qualifications. For example, in Rantsev 
(2010) the Court stated that the ECHR must be interpreted in the light of the VCLT.97 Similarly, in Cyprus v. 
Turkey (2014), the Court said that ‘[d]espite its specific character as a human rights instrument, the Convention 
is an international treaty to be interpreted in accordance with the relevant norms and principles of public 
international law, and, in particular, in the light of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’.98 
 
Three interpretative approaches of the Court are particularly noteworthy: effective interpretation, evolutive 
interpretation, and systemic interpretation. In relation to effective interpretation, an early example is the Golder 
[Plenary] case (1975) where the Court without explicit basis in ECHR article 6 on fair trial read in a right of access 
to a court. Similarly, in the Soering case [Plenary] (1989) the Court noted that ECHR article 5 (1) (f) allowed 
detention with a view to extradition. It held, however, that in interpreting article 3 on the prohibition on torture 
and degrading and inhuman treatment or punishment the Court had to interpret the ECHR ‘so as to make its 
safeguards practical end effective’ and that the interpretation is ‘consistent with the general spirit of the 
                                                 
89 Entitlement of Legal Entities to Hold Rights under the Inter-American Human Rights System, IACtHR (26 February 2016), 
OC-22/16, [39] (this is the Report author’s translation). The original text goes “una regla por si misma ... el ejercicio de 
interpretación debe involucrar el contexto y, en especial, dentro de su objeto y fin”. 
90 For an analysis of the relevant case-law, see Report submitted by Burgorgue-Larsen, 13-9. The last two methods lead to 
such an enlargement of the scope of certain rights that they could be qualified as ‘creating’ new rights. 
91 Viviana Gallardo case. 
92 ‘Other Treaties’ Subjected to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court (Art 64 American Convention on Human Rights), 
IACtHR (24 September 1982), OC-1/82; The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on 
Human Rights (Arts 74 and 75), IACtHR (24 September 1982), OC-2/82; Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4§2 and 
4§4) American Convention on Human Rights), IACtHR (8 September 1983), OC-3/83. 
93 Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties, IACtHR (14 July 1989), OC-10/89, [42]. 
94 Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4§2 and 4§4) American Convention on Human Rights), IACtHR (8 September 
1983), OC-3/83. 
95 For a detailed analysis, see Report submitted by Burgorgue-Larsen, 25-32. 
96 Based on a report submitted by Geir Ulfstein.  
97 Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia (2010), Application No 25965/04, [273]. 
98 Cyprus v Turkey [GC] (2014), Application No 25781/94, [23] (emphasis added) 
Convention, an instrument designed to maintain and promote the ideals and values of a democratic society’.99 
Extradition to US death row was therefore prohibited. This was cited with support in the Mamatkulov and Askarov 
(2005) where the Court, without explicit basis in the ECHR, held that its interim measures were binding on the 
states parties 
 
The jurisprudence of the Court also manifests a tendency to interpret the Convention in an evolutive manner. The 
Tyrer case (1978) introduced the doctrine of the European Convention as a ‘living instrument’,100 which has been 
followed in subsequent cases. The Court has based its evolutive interpretation on what it deems a European 
consensus in domestic law among member states as well as practice in the form of international instruments.101 
As stated in the Demir and Baykara: ‘The consensus emerging from specialized international instruments and 
from the practice of Contracting States may constitute a relevant consideration for the Court when it interprets the 
provisions of the Convention in specific cases’.102 In this respect, it can be concluded that subsequent state practice 
plays a far more extensive role than what is envisaged in article 31 (3) (b) in the Court’s evolutive interpretation. 
But the Court does not make it clear whether the requirements set out in article 31 (3) (b) are fulfilled – or whether 
subsequent state practice is used in the Court’s evolutive interpretation, beyond article 31 (3 (b), based on the 
original evolutive intention of the parties according to article 31 (1).103 
 
The ECtHR has generally expressed its commitment to interpreting the ECHR consistent with other rules of 
international law, in accordance with Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. In Demir and Baykara (2008) the Court 
devoted a full section to ‘[t]he practice of interpreting Convention provisions in the light of other international 
texts and instruments’.104 The relationship between the ECHR and other rules of international law may concern 
general international law or its relationship to other treaties. For example, the Behrami and Saramati (2007) case 
is based on the general rules on attribution of responsibility between the United Nations and member states 
contributing with military forces.105 In a similar vein, the Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and others case (2013) 
concerned the immunity of the United Nations – which partly is based on general international law and partly on 
treaty.106 
 
In addition to the abovementioned approaches, the Court has adopted certain interpretative practices that are 
deferential to Member States. First, the margin of appreciation, as part of the principle of subsidiarity, has been 
developed by the Court since the classic Handyside case in 1976.107 It is now reflected in the Brighton Declaration 
(2012) as well as in the new Protocol 15 to the ECHR. Subsidiarity aims at the protection of national freedom by 
leaving decision-making to states, unless it is more effectively or efficiently performed at the international level.108  
 
In a similar, but slightly different vein, the Bosphorus standard has been applied by the Court since 2005 regarding 
national implementation of EU law.109 This standard means that the ECtHR will not review states’ implementation 
of EU law since the EU is considered to protect human rights ‘in manner which can be considered at least 
equivalent to that for which the Convention provides’. Therefore, the Court applies a presumption that a member 
state respects the Convention obligations when it ‘does no more than implement legal obligations flowing from 
its membership of the organisation’. However, this presumption ‘can be rebutted if, in the circumstances of a 
particular case, it is considered that the protection of Convention rights was manifestly deficient. In such cases, 
the interest of international cooperation would be outweighed by the Convention’s role as a “constitutional 
                                                 
99 Soering v the United Kingdom [Plenary] (1989), Application No 14038/88, [87]. 
100 Tyrer v the United Kingdom (1978), Application No 5856/72, [31]. 
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102 Demir and Baykara v Turkey [GC] (2008), Application No 34503/97, [85] (emphasis added). 
103 See also WA Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary (OUP 2015), 37. 
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109 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland [GC] (2005), Application No 45036/98. 
instrument of European public order” in the field of human rights’.110 This standard has been followed in 
subsequent case law, including the Michaud case (2012)111 and the recent Avotiņš case (2016).112 
 
 
viii. European Charter of Fundamental Rights113 
Interpretation of the EuFRCH (in force since 1/12/2007) follows the general “rules of interpretation” of human 
rights treaties insofar as the Charter does not provide special references or methods to be respected.  
 
The systematic-contextual interpretation finds its counterpart in the principle of ‘unity of Community law’, i.e. 
the synoptical evaluation of all parts of primary law of the EU including the protocols and the EuCHFR with its 
Protocol No. 30 concerning the application of the Charter for Poland and UK. The ECJ underlined in its first 
sentences this overall contextual approach: In Chatzi114 the Court refers to its constant case law where a norm has 
to be interpreted not only according to its wording but in the context and the aims pursued by the norm.115 
Similarly, in Donagh v. Ryan Ltd116 the Court interpreted Arts. 16, 17 EuCHRF and the principle of 
proportionality in accordance with the entire primary law of the Union. 
 
A special case of contextual interpretation is illustrated by Protocol No. 30 for Poland and the UK. The preliminary 
ruling by the Irish High Court in N.S./Secretary of State for the Home Department concerned the potential opting 
out of the UK117 from the EuCHFR. The Court confirmed that Art. 1 par. 1 Protocol No. 30 did not intend to 
exempt the UK nor Poland from the obligations of the Charter nor from providing to observe the obligations 
committed therewith. 
 
The special relevance of the explanations of the Presidency of the Convent however play an additional role in the 
process of interpretation and reflect the relevance of the historical-genetic concretization. As these are not directly 
binding upon the parties they may play an auxiliary part in the process of interpretation. The ECJ in its cases 
Akerberg Fransson and DEB referred to the explanations as additional source of interpretation and thus 
strengthens its argumentative basis already gained by teleological interpretation.118 
 
 
ix. International Criminal Law Tribunals119 
International criminal tribunals, share a unique property, which to some degree affects their interpretative 
approach.  Whereas for other courts and tribunals, a clear line can theoretically be drawn between the applicable 
law on the one hand, and the law regulating matters of the administration of justice on the other, ‘[b]y contrast, in 
international criminal law, the applicable law is, by default, derived from the tribunals’ constituent instruments’.120 
Furthermore, ‘the statutes of international criminal tribunals will generally prevail over other sources of law, 
‘[thus, i]t follows that the bulk of interpretation relates to the tribunals’ statutes and that there is, comparatively 
speaking, less (extraneous) treaty interpretation than in other fields of international law.121 
 
Generally, the tribunals have held that the interpretative rules enshrined in the VCLT apply to their respective 
statutes (irrespective of whether they are a treaty or other instrument – in the latter case, of course, we are talking 
about a mutatis mutandis application).122  
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111 Michaud v France (2012), Application No 12323/11. 
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Arts. 31-32 of the VCLT are frequently quoted by international criminal tribunals either as such,123 or by reference 
to their constitutive elements,124 and applied in a holistic manner,125 albeit not all elements being given equal 
weight. ‘Ordinary meaning’,126 ‘object and purpose’, ‘subsequent practice’,127 and ‘supplementary means’128 have 
all featured prominently in the jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals. That is not to say that the usual 
debates regarding, for instance the multiplicity of objects and purposes129 or the supplementary or not nature of 
Article 32, 130do not plague these courts as well. Art. 33 also poses issues, as in the majority of instances the 
tribunals’ reasoning is based on concepts foreign to the procedure envisaged by that article, for instance the 
adoption of the interpretation that is more ‘favourable to the accused’.131 
 
In this context, of particular note, is the widely diverging approaches of international criminal tribunals on the 
question of whether a teleological interpretation may be used to override the wording of the text, considering also 
that a positive response to the above question may imply a direct conflict with the principle of legality, exemplified 
by, among other, the nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege scripta principle. In a string of ICTY cases, where this 
issue arose only in one was the text preferred.132 In all others, a teleological interpretation, both in its static and 
dynamic/evolutive manifestation was resorted to override the meaning of the text.133     
 
While some academics have suggested that the VCLT rules could/should be modified to accommodate criminal 
law principles, this does not seem to be reflected, yet, in practice. ‘Thus far, it would appear that an all-or-nothing 
approach is chosen, where the result is based exclusively on either the VCLT rules or criminal law principles, at 
the exclusion of the other. In some instances, this may be a deliberate choice aimed at achieving a desired 
interpretative result; in others, it may be that the combined application of the VCLT rules and criminal law 
principles may still be novel’.134  
 
 
x. Regional Courts in Africa135 
Due to the special nature of certain operative African courts, the observations to follow are based on the 
jurisprudence of five (quasi)-judicial bodies:  the Court of Justice of the East African Community (EACJ), the 
Tribunal of the Southern African Development Corporation (SADC-T), the Court of Justice of the Economic 
Community of West African States (CCJ), the African Court on Human and People’s Rights (ACtHR), and the 
African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACmHR). 
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‘Regional African courts are well aware of the political sensitivity of some African states which appear as 
respondents before the courts; all institutions have had to decide on politically sensitive issues. Famously, the 
SADC tribunal with its controversial Campbell judgment against Zimbabwe walked right into repressive 
measures. It cannot be said though that the tribunal’s fate had an impact on the interpretive work of other African 
courts.’136 
 
Most of these courts do not refer explicitly to the VCLT, and are apodictic and concise with respect to their 
interpretative exercise. The EACJ is a notable exception on both counts.137 The ECOWAS CCJ is also unique in 
the sense that it applies rules of statutory interpretation, that it calls ‘general principles of the construction of 
documents’.138 Although textual interpretation features prominently in the jurisprudence of these bodies 
(especially in the case of the CCJ, where the court has refused, more than once, to use any other interpretative 
method if the ordinary meaning is clear),139 it is tempered by references to ‘good faith’,140 ‘effet utile’,141 and the 
corpus juriprudentiae of human rights.142 On occasion, these courts have shown extreme diligence in defining 
key concepts of the interpretative process, such as ‘ordinary meaning’,143 ‘good faith’,144 and ‘subsequent 
practice’145 
 
Although well-known extra-VCLT maxims of interpretation (such as expression unius est exclusion alterius, 
exception est strictissimae applicationis, in dubio mitius etc.) have not been used by the courts themselves, they 
are resorted to in the pleadings of the Applicants and the Defendants, drawing inspiration from their common law 
background.146  
 
Some other interesting examples, of various (alleged) interpretative techniques, include: i) ECOWAS CCJ’s 
reliance on a common law interpretation maxim (the “Mischief Rule”, which allows a departure from the literal 
rule, also called “the Golden Rule”);147 ii) ACmHR’s demand that the African Charter should be interpreted in ‘a 
culturally sensitive way’, taking into full account the different legal traditions of Africa’s diversity;148 iii)  
ACmHR’s acceptance that the principle of subsidiarity shapes the African Charter like all other human rights 
treaties, but refusal to accept a restrictive effect of the doctrine on the Commission’s work.149 the principle of 




xi. Iran-US Claims Tribunal150 
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The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (IUSCT) is in a unique position insofar as the negotiation of the agreements took 
place solely through an intermediary, the Government of Algeria. This means that the proposals, counter-
proposals and comments that led to the final Declarations were sent between the three parties in writing, and are 
thus well-documented. As a result, the Tribunal has readily referred to the travaux preparatoires, as well as 
occasionally giving weight to affidavits from negotiators related to the meaning of a particular provision. 
 
With the exception of the first decision it issued,151 the IUSCT has consistently referred to the provisions of the 
VCLT when interpreting the agreements.152 The Tribunal generally follows the ‘orthodox’ application of the 
VCLT provisions, considering that the intention of the Parties as embodied in the text of the Declarations is the 
starting point for interpretation, then moving to the context, object and purpose of the agreements, subsequent 
practice, and the preparatory work/circumstances of conclusion of the agreements, if necessary.153 Although it 
generally follows this progression through the elements of Articles 31 and 32, it does not necessarily refer to each 
and every element.  
 
The structure of the Tribunal’s analysis in Award No. 597 provides an illustrative example.154 The Tribunal first 
looked to the ordinary meaning of the text, referring approvingly to the jurisprudence of the International Court 
of Justice, according to which ‘interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty.’155 After finding 
that the text of the relevant provision was ‘clear’,156 it nevertheless moved to examine the context of the provision, 
which it defined as ‘primarily the text of the treaty itself – in other words, the remaining provisions of the same 
treaty.’157 Having found that the ordinary meaning in its context was clear, the Tribunal moved to find 
confirmation for this view in the negotiating history of the Algiers Declarations.158 
 
The Tribunal has occasionally referred to canons of interpretation outside the VCLT, such as effet utile,159 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius,160 ejusdem generis,161 and, in four early awards, restrictive interpretation.162 
 
Unlike certain other tribunals, the IUSCT has rarely defined the key concepts in the interpretative process. In 
Award A11, it defined context as ‘primarily the text of the treaty itself – in other words, the remaining provisions 
of the same treaty.’163 The Tribunal identified the object and purpose of the Algiers Declarations as being to ‘to 
resolve a crisis in relations between Iran and the United States, not to extend diplomatic protection in a normal 
sense,’164 and has stressed that the object and purpose ‘do not form any independent basis for interpretation, but 
rather are factors to be taken into account’ in determining the meaning of the terms of the treaty’.165 The Tribunal 
seems to take a relatively strict approach to subsequent practice, stating that it ‘may be relevant in shedding light 
on the original intentions of the Parties and is compelling evidence of the parties’ understanding as to the meaning 
of the treaty’s provisions’, which is demonstrated by ‘a concordant, common and consistent practice’.166 
 
The Tribunal’s approach to materials admissible in the interpretative process is notable. Whilst referring most 
commonly to the preparatory work of the Algiers Declaration, the Tribunal seems in principle to accept that 
affidavits by negotiators could be instructive in shedding light on the intended meaning of a particular term. 
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However, it seems in practice to rarely have given affidavits weight.167 More broadly, the Tribunal has drawn on 
the jurisprudence of the ICJ in order to inform its interpretative approach.168 
 
 
xii. International Investment Tribunals169 
The interpretative approach of international investment tribunals is shaped by three groups of considerations. 
First, the procedural-institutional setting of tribunals, which permit individuals or corporate entities to make 
claims against States, rely on domestic courts for enforcement, and are constituted on an ad hoc basis, provides a 
notably different backdrop to the interpretative practice of investment tribunals than permanent courts or tribunals. 
Second, from a substantive point of view, the vast majority of international investment agreements are bilateral, 
relatively short, and contain vague and broadly worded provisions. Finally, issues of policy and legitimacy have 
featured more prominently in investment arbitration over the years, including issues related to environment, 
health, and financial crises. Other issues, such as controversy over the size of awards issued and the composition 
of arbitral tribunals also constitute the backdrop against which the interpretative approach of investment tribunals 
should be viewed.  
 
The overwhelming majority of investment tribunals make reference to, and accept, the VCLT rules in relation to 
interpretation, including frequent acknowledgement of the customary nature of those rules. Many tribunals have 
explicitly recognized Article 31 as a ‘single’,170 ‘integral’,171 ‘all-encompassing’172 rule that takes a ‘holistic 
approach’173 without creating a hierarchy between different elements of the provision. 
 
In relation to ordinary meaning, many tribunals have closely adhered to the ‘objective’ approach enshrined in the 
VCLT. For example, the Tribunal in Methanex v. U.S. consider that ordinary meaning was not coextensive with 
literal meaning, and that such interpretation could not ‘be decided on a purely semantic basis’.174 In relation to 
context, however, tribunals have not adhered as closely to the approach of the Vienna Convention. In particular, 
certain tribunals have analysed the investment treaty practice of one or both parties to a case with third States for 
the purpose of interpretation. In ADC v. Hungary, for example, the Tribunal looked into other treaties that Hungary 
had concluded with third States in order to determine which entities qualified as an ‘investor’ under the relevant 
treaty.175 It is not clear whether tribunals considered this reasoning to be relevant context under Article 31(2) of 
the VCLT, or an additional means of determining the ordinary meaning of the treaty. In relation to the object and 
purpose of a treaty, and in contrast to some earlier arbitral decisions, tribunals have recently emphasized that the 
preamble of a treaty may be used to discern the object and purpose of that treaty, but that it cannot in and of itself 
‘add substantive requirements to the provisions of the Treaty’.176 
 
Given the fragmented nature of the regime, one cannot speak of a consistent approach to treaty interpretation over 
time. Nevertheless, certain commonalities may be discerned. First, when addressing the issue whether an 
underlying treaty is capable of evolving over time, tribunals have regularly based their reasoning on Articles 
31(3)(a), (b), or (c) of the VCLT. Only in a handful of instances have tribunals considered evolutive interpretation 
as a separate doctrine dissociated from the Vienna Convention. Second, whilst some tribunals have adopted a 
more expansive understanding of these rules, overall the picture is one of restraint. 
 
Despite the ad hoc nature by which tribunals are constituted, many tribunals have been careful to support their 
interpretative approach by reference to the Vienna Convention rules and/or by recourse to the practice of the ICJ. 
Divergence from the Vienna rules in the practice of tribunals can be explained by, on the one hand, the vagueness 
of the provisions of many international investment agreements, and, on the other, concerns regarding the 
legitimacy of tribunals. In relation to the former, the elements of Article 31(1) VCLT are of little help in 
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substantiating broad treaty standards; as such, tribunals have moved to search for more concrete guidance from, 
for example, case law. In relation to the latter, tribunals have frequently drawn on the jurisprudence of the ICJ in 
order to ground their reasoning in the jurisprudence of a reputed court. 
 
 
Annex: Questionnaire sent to Members 
 
I. Content-related Issues/Questions 
1. Do the courts and tribunals refer to the VCLT rules of interpretation? Do they discuss the content of these rules?  
2. Preference/Prevalence of a particular approach to interpretation over others (textual, contextual, teleological, 
intentions of the parties, historical). Has the approach changed over time? 
3. When has the case-law of an international court and tribunal indicated a clear shift in the content of a rule of 
interpretation? How was this established?  
4. When, how and what maxims/canons of interpretation (not explicitly referred to in the VCLT) have been used 
in international case-law? What is their status?  
5. How do courts and tribunals define key concepts in the interpretative process (e.g. ordinary meaning, context, 
object and purpose [multiplicity, selection between a variety of objects and purposes]), supplementary means etc.? 
6.  Is there a difference between the interpretative approach to treaties and that to unilateral acts of States and/or 
acts of international organizations?   
7. How do courts and tribunals respond to multiple authentic and conflicting texts of a treaty (or any other 
instrument)? How has Art. 33 VCLT been employed in practice? Does the procedure followed by courts and 
tribunals differ from that of Art. 33 VCLT?  
 
II. Process-related Issues/Questions 
1. The variety of materials used during the interpretative process and their probative value (e.g. dictionaries, 
commentaries, books, statements etc.)  
2. Do international courts and tribunals have a tendency to explain the process and stages of their interpretative 
reasoning? If yes, what is the form that this usually takes? 
3. What internal or external factors (e.g. contract incompleteness, statute of the court, the background of judges, 
the subject area, political constellations or situations, concerns about the court’s legitimacy, or about 
implementation of the judgment) affect the interpretative choices of international courts and tribunals, or changes 
in such choices, and in what manner? 
 
III. Systemic Issues/Questions 
1. What are the defining characteristics that differentiate interpretation from gap-filling and normative conflict? 
How do courts and tribunals address these processes? 
2. When have international courts and tribunals interpreted (not identified) the rules of interpretation? How do 
they distinguish between interpretation and identification? 
